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Purpose: Given the spread of multi‐level governance tools, interaction between local 
and regional governments has become an important mechanism for service delivery 
and the implementation of public policies. This paper empirically tests a model of 
cooperative relations affecting local governments and thus having an impact on local 
autonomy and dependence. 
 
Design: This article takes previous typologies as a starting point to theoretically build 
and empirically test a model of cooperative relations based on two selected indicators: 
the degree of autonomy‐dependence and the degree of rigidity‐flexibility of the 
cooperative system. In a second step, the authors manipulate the model numerically to 
match real data coming from southern European local governments in order to assess 
how the theory performs in a concrete space and time. 
 
Findings: Combining the aforementioned concepts creates a four‐option theoretical 
model that describes four possible situations in which cooperative intergovernmental 
relations can be empirically located. 
 
Originality: This article highlights the need to conduct empirical studies in order to 
trace the characteristics and evolution of cooperative relations between local 
governments and upper tiers. This is particularly relevant when referring to 
mechanisms that can vary over time. In the current big and open data era, this 
empirical process will become easier and more affordable. In this context, local 
government studies benefit from particular features that improve the conduct of this 
kind of analysis: a large ‘N’ configuration (a large number of units to be included) and 




I. Multi-level governance as a non-static concept 
 
In a multi‐level governance scenario, central‐local relations are increasingly important 
and politically relevant. In fact, this field is currently a key element of local 
development strategy, in part because it deeply affects the whole intergovernmental 
system. The cooperative and non‐conflictual development of instruments between 
different levels of government offers an excellent departure point for studying the 
institutional design of legal ties and governance models at the local level. This is 
especially relevant in systems of the so‐called Napoleonic model, where ties are usually 
legally determined and leave an administrative trace that is easy to reconstruct. 
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Previous studies in this field have pointed to an important increase in the use of 
different types of multi‐level instrument. In fact, a wide range of policies are supposed 
to be implemented at two, or even more, overlapping territorial levels. In general, 
current models assess the situation of local government systems taking into account 
permanent government tiers only.  
 
One of the most frequently used ways of changing or distributing competencies 
without reforming the territorial basis of local governments is the establishment of 
intergovernmental ties. Without affecting local governments’ legal and administrative 
boundaries, central governments sometimes plot the delivery of services according to 
different territorial and administrative bases. Delivering services in territories that are 
different from the single municipality implies, in fact, a restructuring of local 
governments (Wollmann, 2004; Steiner, 2003; Bel et al., 2007). Therefore, the main 
objective of the paper is twofold: the theoretical design of a model that describes 
vertical cooperative intergovernmental relations on the one hand, and to test the 
impact of those vertical cooperative relations in a concrete system of local government 
on the other. Thus, our model covers the cooperative aspect of all intergovernmental 
design.  
 
Indeed, building comparative models to analyse the systemic behaviour of different 
levels of government when interacting and cooperating could be seen as a useful tool. 
Taking the core concepts of both frameworks as a starting point, the paper builds a 
simple theoretical model able to compare the cooperative and non‐conflictual 
relationships between levels of government across time and space. 
 
Linkages and ties between different local government organisations may imply a new 
institutional system with its own logic. This new institutional system has a certain 
meaning for all its members and a structure that is somehow more than a mere means 
to achieve goals. The theoretical model can be used to compare different political 
systems and institutional frameworks by identifying key indicators and assigning them 
standardised values. This would allow researchers to trace the evolution of those 
linkages in a temporal or static way. The model is useful not only for analysing their 
position according to selected variables, but also for identifying their past evolution 
and how they could (or should) evolve in the future. Moreover, it is possible to analyse 
a temporal series for a single country and, where data are available, to place concrete 
political systems in a certain moment in time and compare them.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents different theoretical 
approaches to intergovernmental relations, together with an introduction to the policy 
instruments literature—the anchoring concepts for empirically testing cooperative 
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relations. The third section presents the data and proposes a theoretically‐driven model 
of vertical cooperative relations. The fourth section manipulates the model numerically 
to match Spanish data, while the final section is devoted to conclusions.  
 
II. Models of local government and models of relations: the impact of the 
intergovernmental framework 
 
The search for comparative models for analysing local governments is not new and has 
evolved over time into an increasingly complex approach. As Stoker highlighted, the 
literature on comparative local governance began with a descriptive study of formally 
elected institutions of local government that lacked a certain depth and any capacity to 
examine more informal, underlying practices (Stoker, 2006). The study of local 
governments has always tried to classify different systems by their main institutional 
characteristics. The classical approach of Page and Goldsmith created a typology based 
on a comparison of functions (competencies) assigned to local governments, their 
autonomous capacity to take decisions (self‐government) and their capacity to access 
national policy‐makers (Page and Goldsmith, 1987). Hesse and Sharpe (1991) added 
the basic question of local democracy to the former classification, while Heinelt and 
Hlepas (2006) included the question of vertical and horizontal institutional 
relationships as characteristics relevant to understanding different models of local 
government. 
 
Following on from these institutional typologies, other authors promoted 
classifications based more on the capacities and functions of local governments than on 
institutional features. In this sense, Lidström (1998) created a model typology based not 
on institutional features but on the relative position of local governments in the system 
of intergovernmental relations and its effect on local autonomy. Lidström (1998) 
created a classification based on the distribution of tasks between levels of government 
and local government discretion in the allocation of goods and policies. In another 
relevant study with Sellers, Lidström analysed how infrastructures of local 
government make much of their differences to establish effective welfare policies in 
every state. Conducting a systematic classification of welfare infrastructures, the 
authors revealed a close relationship between decentralisation to local government and 
the character and resilience of the welfare state (Sellers and Lidström, 2007). 
 
One of the last tentative attempts to identify a useful model of classification was that 
by Stoker, who tried to improve on previous typologies by classifying local 
governments in terms of concepts relating to the four core functions of all local 
government: the creation of local identity, its role in economic development, the 
welfare model produced at the local level and coordination capacity in the face of 
complex decision‐making settings (Stoker, 2011). In this same vein, Ladner et al. (2016) 
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designed a system that analysed the evolution of self‐rule capacity in a large number of 
different countries. Their Local Autonomy Index comprised a set of variables that 
included structural and operating components, and offered the possibility of 
monitoring central‐local relations. Even though this is one of the most comprehensive 
measuring mechanisms to date, it does not explicitly include the impact of multi‐level 
or horizontal cooperative mechanisms.  
 
When focusing solely on classifying local governments through their 
intergovernmental relations, attention should be directed to the ties, and their basic 
features, emerging in the multi‐level governance environment. Previously these 
relationships have been considered mainly from two basic perspectives: the design of 
institutions and central‐local relations. Both approaches emphasise different features of 
the game of intergovernmental relations. Moreover, as theoretical contributions both 
are perfectly complementary and as such, efforts should be made to operationalise 
them: the multi‐level governance concept can be used both as a framework for analysis 
and a conceptual approach to the study of decision‐making and the design of 
institutions; the central‐local approach can be used as a theoretical tool to identify 
relevant political features and multi‐level ties.  
 
The study of dependency and autonomy is a key focus for all local government 
analysis: ‘[…] it is important because autonomy is the heart of the very justification of 
most systems of elected local government. If local governments lack the ability to 
determine for themselves the mix of local goods and services, as well as local tax rates, 
then local governments are no more than an administrative arm of the central state, 
and the election of local representatives serves little purpose’ (Goldsmith, 1995: 229). 
On the subject of central‐local relations specifically, Laffin argues that: ‘The 
proliferation of central‐local linkages, characteristic of governance, is relevant to 
whether central government is emerging as a strong centre or as a weak/hollowed out 
government. This question relates to the extent of (1) central government’s steering 
capacity over local authorities and the central‐local linkages as well as over the 
national‐level policy networks; […], and (3) locally‐based actors’ capacity to achieve 
their own objectives and defend their discretion’ (Laffin, 2009: 6). In this framework, 
the direction and intensity of linkages and cooperative relations have a direct impact 
on the degree of autonomy or control coming from central governments, since 
autonomy can be understood as a policy‐making capacity and the capacity to 
politically self‐organise.  
 
Hooghe and Marks (2003) cogent conceptualisation of multi‐level governance offers a 
useful approach for exploring the relevant variables in the patterns of relationships 
between territories and governments. They identified two main types of multi‐level 
governance that respond to very different methods of articulating power over the 
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territory and between levels of government. The first type (Type I) is in some ways 
related to a federal system of government and is characterised by: levels of government 
that tend to be general purpose; units of government that tend to share responsibilities; 
having a limited number of government levels; and a tendency to fix stable 
institutional structures. In contrast, Type II represents the intellectual basis of 
neoclassical economists and theorists of public choice. Hence, this type is characterised 
by: specialised levels of government (i.e. as service providers); units of government 
sharing responsibilities based on the best way to internalise costs and benefits; great 
diversity in levels of government; and a flexible and malleable, basic institutional 
design.  
 
These two types of multi‐level governance lead to two very different conceptions of 
governance, in its broadest sense. Depending on which of the two types is in place, one 
can find patterns of stability in intergovernmental relations (Type I) or patterns of 
diversity and change (Type II). Both models seek a more efficient distribution and 
implementation of decision‐making, but both also lead to completely different 
institutional and organisational designs and patterns of relationships between 
governments. To assess the main variables explaining the existence of Type I or Type 
II, Hooghe and Marks (2003) highlight up to four key dimensions of institutional 
design: the opposition of territorial versus field‐specific; the dichotomy of general 
versus specific (transversal or specific capabilities); the dichotomy of centralisation or 
decentralisation; and the opposition of temporary versus lasting institutions. These 
four dimensions express, in a nutshell, how flexible the institutional structure is in 
order for institutions to adapt to social heterogeneity and diversity. As John clearly 
points out, ‘one of the basic elements of governance is the changed character of 
institutions themselves’ (John, 2001: 109). Moreover, the institutional response to 
complexity is to reform the territorial organisation of decentralised government, which 
leads us to basic questions of institutional design.  
 
The broadening of the (multi‐level) governance concept—suggesting that less formal 
means of co‐ordination and decision‐making may drive central‐local relations in 
addition to formal, hierarchical methods of government—brings the study of 
comparative local governance to a new stage: non‐conflictual relations between tiers of 
government. Denters and Rose, for instance, identified a broad shift towards 
governance, assuming that bargaining, agreements, contracting, partnerships and 
networking, most of which are also related to New Public Management techniques, are 
typical expressions of governance (Denters and Rose, 2005a, 2005b). Accordingly, the 
existence of linkages and practices should be taken into account, along with the extent 
of discretion given to local governments in terms of decision‐making and access to 
central government (Chandler, 2005; Stoker, 2006). 
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While most of the literature on fiscal decentralisation has duly highlighted questions of 
competition between tiers of government and between units of government, either 
vertically (Breton, 2006; Dafflon, 2006; Treismann, 2007) or horizontally (Salmon, 2015), 
less attention has been paid to relations based on cooperation as opposed to conflict. 
Being aware that existing conflictual relations may reflect only a partial picture of 
intergovernmental relations, we have concentrated on building a model and measure 
exclusive to the growing importance of cooperation. Indeed, competition is 
characterised by the non‐formalisation of agreements, so they will not yield in a formal 
cooperation tool, which is the core of our proposal.  
 
Moreover, the literature on fiscal decentralisation is not clear on the consequences of 
competition. Breton (2006) argues that without vertical conflict and competition, 
decentralisation is hard to conceptualise. However, Dafflon (2006) stresses the 
difficulty of creating a model to assign functions in decentralised governments built 
exclusively upon conflict: ‘The assignment of responsibilities to (de)centralize levels of 
government can be organized along several criteria (…) No doubt these criteria have 
opposing forces (…) and no doubt local, regional and central government may have 
divergent opinions’ (p.300), but, as recognised previously, ‘the problem of 
(re)assigning functions (…) are not in the nature of things capable of ultimate, once‐
and‐for‐all, general prescriptions’ (p. 299). In a similar vein, Treismann (2007) argues 
that competition to attract resources and capital is a useful mechanism to achieve either 
decentralisation or its opposite (centralisation), and that the architecture of government 
will mainly depend on the nature of policy games established among the political 
actors in the different tiers. All these approaches deal with issues relevant to aiding 
further understanding of decentralisation. Our interest, however, lies in emphasising a 
less apparent reality, i.e. the (growing) imperative for public administrations to 
cooperate in order to achieve common goals and obj ctives, and the way these 
relationships reshape the institutional system created. 
 
With such a complex and vast institutionalisation of ties, it seems logical that some 
systemic patterns of behaviour can be identified. This identification can be achieved 
naturally by taking into account the nature and effects of policy instruments. Thus, 
linkages and ties between different local government organisations can imply a new 
institutional system: the complete picture of these tools may be the result not only of 
fragmented interests, but of a systemic movement. The result of an increasing number 
of relations and linkages might be more than a network; it might become a de facto new 
institutional setting.  
 
To trace and account for such variation in institutional ties, our operational analysis is 
anchored in what the literature identifies as a policy instruments approach. This 
approach has historically focused on several ways of analysing policy tools: first, by 
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focusing on interactions between individuals and government (the different forms of 
organisation available to government); second, by analysing the politics of instrument 
selection (the interests or ideas that shape the choice of tools); and third, by cataloguing 
the available toolkit in a generic way (Hood and Margetts, 2007). Finally, Peters 
developed a useful analytical framework by linking policy instruments and policy 
management (Peters, 2000). Thus, this paper assumes that tracing and quantifying 
instrument selection may help to understand how the choice of policy instrument 
affects central‐local relations. 
 
Considering relations between central and local government as instruments legally 
carrying those linkages provides our analysis with a tool for effective comparison 
(Hood, 1986). Instruments of public policy are the method by which governments seek 
to achieve political objectives (Blair, 2002); and so, by searching for a better way of 
implementing a policy, theoretically the choice of one type of instrument over another 
has a direct bearing on the best way to improve public service’ (Blair, 2002). However, 
the political decision concerning the choice of instrument is never neutral, and may 
have hidden intentions and unintended effects (Kassim and Le Galès, 2010; Lascoumes 
and Le Galès, 2004; Lascoumes and Simard, 2011). 
 
The basic literature on institutional design raises the possibility of exploring the nature 




III. Exploring a new proposal and methodological challenges 
 
As Wolman (2008) points out, there is a lack of common framework for conducting 
comparative studies of local/urban research, and questions relating to quantification 
and effective comparability are a relevant part of this dilemma. In this study we want 
to situate and trace the strategic direction of any cooperative system, so we need a 
model that is able to analyse reality in a given moment and account for changes over 
time. To achieve this, the construction of our model follows the approach used for 
models of strategic orientation (Ramió and Salvador Serna, 1999; Ramió et al., 2007). 
Thus the authors propose a two‐variable axis model in which the object of study can be 
placed. The model is useful not only for analysing the object’s position according to the 
selected variables, but also for identifying what could (or should) be its future 
direction. It is true that the model is primarily used for organisational strategic reform, 
but it could be useful, too, for institutional strategic planning. Consequently, two main 
axes of analysis emerge: the flexibility or rigidity of the cooperative system on the one 
hand, and its tendency to align either with local autonomy or a centralised system on 
the other.  
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Figure 1 below shows the structure of analysis and distribution of concepts. On the 
vertical axis lies the dichotomy of local autonomy and dependency. Our 
conceptualisation of these terms has been developed taking the work of Entwistle and 
Laffin (2003), and their approach to central‐local as mentioned above, as its starting 
point. Local autonomy and dependency are considered extremes of a continuum where 
the hypothetical centre would be a neutral position (obviously, this situation is more a 
theoretical construct than a feasible possibility in a practical application).  
 
The concepts of ‘flexibility’ and ‘rigidity’ make up the second (horizontal) axis, again as 
opposite positions on the same spectrum: institutional robustness and resilience to 
change. Hooghe and Marks’ (2003) typology is the starting point here, and specifically 
those elements of their typology that are exclusive and closely related to institutional 
performance—namely, whether there is a limited number of government levels or it is 
an open system, and whether the system tends to fix stable institutional structures or 
builds a flexible and malleable institutional architecture.  
 
The combined effect of both theoretical axes allows us to present our theoretical model. 
The flexibility‐rigidity of the system permits us to take into account partners’ capacity 
to change and make the system evolve over time (this is autonomy, understood as self‐




So, placing any cooperative system at the top of the vertical axis would mean that the 
system is completely respectful of local autonomy. In contrast, placing a system at the 
very bottom would mean that municipalities face a strongly centralised system. On the 
horizontal axis, the flexibility or rigidity of the cooperative system is identifiable by its 
capacity to change and adapt over time and space. In this case, placing the system on 
the left of the axis would mean a completely adaptive and changing system of ties and 
linkages, while the right represents strong cooperative institutions, difficult to adapt 
and change over time and space because they are stable and static in nature. Our 
assumption concerning flexibility and rigidity is that, on the one hand, a rigid system—
with either higher or lower autonomy granted to local units—hampers future capacity 
to change and adapt to new realities, thus freezing a given picture. On the other hand, 
a flexible pattern of relations between levels of government—either highly 
autonomous or dependent—allows the model to evolve, and therefore respects local 
(organisational) capacity to change and adapt. 
 
As a two‐by‐two table emerges, the model proposes four theoretical positions in which 
a cooperative system can be situated. 
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1. Agreeing. This option would imply great respect for local autonomy and a high 
level of flexibility in the use of cooperative instruments. The system allows 
participating parties to be in a relationship on (almost) equal terms.  
2. Partner. This option comes from Entwistle and Laffin’s (2003) definition, which 
sees formal institutions and conventions as instruments for building strong and 
stable partnerships. The characteristic situation is one in which local 
governments and centres are confident and build stable and pro‐local 
autonomous instruments of cooperation. 
3. Bargaining. This option again follows Entwistle and Laffin’s perspective, this 
time on bargaining among institutions. The scenario implies that there is no 
equality between parties in relationships, and that local governments try to 
negotiate in order to achieve better conditions for providing services and 
policy‐making.  
4. Strong centre model. This model represents the concept of centralised 
cooperative systems at its purest, and implies clear central leadership. The main 
feature here is strong control coming from the centre, since the implemented 
linkages and ties are stable, difficult to adapt and not inclined towards local 
autonomy.  
 
Having defined these four theoretical spaces, we will operationalise them using 
relevant variables to measure them. The basic idea is to find mutually exclusive 
characteristics that can provide us with valuable information for both axes. All the 
information should be extracted by analysing every instrument used to engage in 
cooperative relations.  
 
Therefore, the following elements are included under the concept of flexibility and 
rigidity. 
1. Temporal determination. That is, whether the instrument itself implies a 
determinate period of time or is a free will option for the parties. 
2. Regulation and process. To what extent the processes of creation and 
dissolution of instruments is easy and reasonably short, or long and arduous 
(the existence of a strong organisational veto points to effective decisions on the 
implementation of the tool).  
3. New legal personality. Does the creation of the instrument imply the generation 
of a new legal personality free from the political will of the participants?  
4. Level of decision. Is the creation of the instrument just an operative decision, or 
does it require the agreement of a higher authority in each of the participating 
institutions? 
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Under autonomy and dependency, the following considerations are included. 
1. Local vs central‐regional responsibilities. Is the tool designed to develop local 
or central‐regional responsibilities or competencies? 
2. Veto option. Is it possible for local government not to accept a decision once the 
linkage is established?  
3. The source and destination of funding. Are funds specifically assigned to a 
particular purpose? 
4. Capacity to introduce local objectives. Are local authorities able to introduce 
their own objectives in the day‐to‐day operation of the cooperative instrument?  
 
So, our theoretical model should take into account the aforementioned features when 
being built empirically. However, there is still a need to specify how to quantify each 
feature.  
 
Building the model empirically 
 
In the same way that others have attempted to quantify local autonomy or local 
decision‐making (Fleurke & Willmemse, 2006; Hooghe et al., 2008b; Ladner et al., 2016; 
Sellers and Lidström, 2007), this paper operationalises the selected variables and for 
both axes identifies four indicators, each of which is assigned values in order to 
empirically feed our model.  
 
Flexibility vs rigidity axis 
The flexibility‐rigidity axis defines the relationship in terms of the level of complexity 
of change. If patterns of operation were to be modified, would it be easy, or would it 
meet with strong resistance? The paper identifies four indicators.  
FR1. Temporal indicator. Is the linkage or instrument temporally undetermined?  
An affirmative response to this question implies that the linkage is supposed to be 
active with no specific deadline or automatic renewal (codifying an affirmative 
response as 1). A negative response, in contrast, implies that the relationship or linkage 
has a limited duration in time (codifying a negative response as 0). The first requires an 
action to deactivate it, but the latter does not require any agreement or action to make 
it end. The end of the linkage is programmed from the very beginning. The temporal 
indicator (henceforth FR1) is defined as a dichotomous indicator. 
FR2. Regulation and process. To what extent does the regulation and process of the 
instrument require a complex procedure?  
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The model considers degree of regulation and process as an indicator of rigidity. The 
stricter the procedure and requirements, and the higher the authority who signs the 
agreement, the more difficult its modification becomes. A scale from 1 to 4 has been 
designed, where 1 is the lowest degree of regulation and process (henceforth FR2) and 
4 the highest. In order to assign values, different procedures and regulations were 
assigned. Being aware of the methodological limitations involved, we transformed the 
indicator into a rank order (0–1) in a second step.  
 
FR3. Different institutional body (hereafter FR3). Does the linkage or instrument 
create a different institutional body?  
 
The mere existence of a new organisation implies an increase in resistance to change 
(codifying a positive response as 1). In any bureaucratic environment, the process of 
creation of an entity is always easier than its extinction (codifying a negative response 
as 0). That is why this aspect is an indicator of rigidity of the system. FR3 is defined as 
a dichotomous indicator.  
FR4. Possibility of delegation of the final decision (henceforth FR4). Must the final 
decision always be taken by the highest position in the original organisation?  
The fact that the final decision on the agreement or linkage must be taken by the 
highest position in the entity, with no possibility of delegation, is considered an 
indicator of rigidity (coding a positive response as 1: the final decision must always be 
taken by the highest position). This could be seen as hinting at political involvement 
and may imply more complexities in cases of potential willingness to change. The 
model considers the possibility of transference of the decision to lower levels in the 
organisation (a ‘no’ to the previous question) as a sign of flexibility. This option will be 
codified as 0. FR4 is defined as a dichotomous indicator.  
Summing up, the selected variables under the ’rigidity‐flexibility‘ concept lend the 
model fundamental insights into the architectural design of identified relations. This 
axis strengthens the theoretical model with the institutional design of ties. The four 
concepts included on this axis do not relate directly to the ’classical‘ concept of local 
autonomy, but when interacting they can strongly modify and affect its nature and 
extent since they may deeply affect political institutions’ self‐organisation. Indeed, the 
concept of flexible design allows margins of manoeuvre—that is to say, potential 
adaptation to new situations—while a rigid model implies a loss of control—and 
therefore, of capacity to change or adapt—by the parties involved.       
 
Autonomy vs dependency axis 
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The second variable used to build the model is defined in terms of the autonomy of the 
local government from the political centre. 
AD1. Formal responsibility for the function; local competence (henceforth AD1). The 
centre might create trends of dependency through intervention in local responsibilities. 
Consequently, the agreement will be considered as more respectful of local autonomy 
if its content does not imply any central intervention in local responsibilities. This 
indicator has been built according to a 1 to 4 scale, where 1 is minimum compulsory 
local functions and 4 includes those functions that are supposed to be developed by 
other levels of government.  
AD2. Veto option (henceforth AD2). This indicator expresses the possibility of the 
local authority not accepting a decision, even if that implies the use of the exit option in 
terms of Hirschman’s organisational approaches (Hirschman, 1970). 
 
This indicator expresses the capacity of the local authority not to accept a decision 
(even breaking the agreement or linkage). Conversely, the local authority may have to 
accept a decision taken by a board or a body according to a majority rule. The AD2 
indicator is defined as a dichotomous indicator: coding a positive response as 1 and a 
negative as 0. 
 
AD3. Earmarked funding (henceforth AD3). Are the funds specifically assigned to a 
particular purpose? Is there a margin of discretion regarding the final destination of 
resources?  
 
This indicator, defined as dichotomous, expresses the capacity to introduce purposes 
for funds. The ability to decide on the final destination of resources is understood as 
hinting at autonomy, and the lack of it, in turn, as a sign of dependence: coding a 
positive response as 1 and a negative as 0. 
 
AD4. Possibility of introduction of local objectives. Has the local authority the facility 
to introduce its own objectives in terms of the instrument? The opposite situation 
would imply that a pre‐set articulation must be accepted.  
 
This indicator, built as dichotomous, expresses whether or not the local authority can 
introduce its own preferences into the agreement. The operationalisation of this 
concept is neither easy nor evident, as 0 would imply no possibility at all, while in a 
real framework a completely closed convention is difficult to conceive. In other words, 
the very fact of creating a link involves a process of negotiation and consensus‐
building. 
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In order to obtain the position of the system, in a second step all the values were 
transformed into a 0 to 1 rank. The two variable values assigned to each instrument are 




The aggregated position of the system in the model will be the result of the mean of 
each of the variables [1]:  
 
where the 1 value is absolute flexibility and 4 absolute rigidity on the FR axis, and 1 is 
strong dependency, 4 maximum local autonomy on the AD axis. 
 
IV. Testing the model in a concrete reality from southern Europe  
 
To numerically stimulate our model we used data from Spain, and in particular the 
Catalonia region since it is considered a suitable test‐bed for such a theoretical model. 
Spain has evolved to a multi‐level governance model over the last 20 years, mainly due 
to two intensive processes of dispersion of central government powers: regionalisation 
and Europeanisation. It is important to note that despite these intensive processes, they 
have not been followed up by devolution to local governments. The Spanish 
Constitution establishes up to three main levels of government—central, regional and 
local—and at the same time establishes political autonomy (or the right to self‐
government) for all of them; but for local governments, that right is not accompanied 
by sufficient economic independence to allow political autonomy to be expressed 
effectively. While regions have become strong centres in terms of political and 
economic capacity, local governments continue to have much less spending capacity 
compared with the other two. 
 
Vertical cooperation between local governments and the Catalan government is legally 
carried out through distinct instruments and channels. All instruments that have left a 
legal trace of their existence and had a formal impact on the institutional system in 
2009 have been included. The model focuses on those legal instruments identified as 
conducting vertical cooperative and collaborative relations that fulfil at least one of two 
main conditions: 
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a. They create an organism with a different legal personality from that of the 
original institutions, meaning that a new jurisdiction is created, and the new 
institution formally escapes the direct control and direction of its formative 
institutions. 
b. They structure cooperation in terms of formal equality between parts. That is 
to say, in legal terms, none of the actors holds a position of leadership or 
dominance in the configuration of the cooperative relationship. Theoretically, 
the cooperating institutions share common goals and determine a significant 
allocation of functions [2]. 
 
According to our theoretical framework, we selected all instruments where a common 
agreement between governmental units was compulsory to implement them, since this 
is the basic requirement of our model. Thus we identified consortia, public mercantile 
societies, public foundations and agreements, since these were the unique vertical 
instruments that met our theoretical requirements. The basic political and legal features 
of these instruments are summarised in Table 1, but all of them express political 
agreement between levels (which can include private actors), have been created to 




The theoretical institutional design of these instruments implies that none of the actors 
holds a position of leadership or dominance in the creation of the vertical cooperative 
relationship: they share common goals once governments establish an agreement to 
create one of them. There is no clear indicator for measuring the political germ of these 
agreements; however, our main presumption about systemic leadership is based on a 
dominant central government. Most of these instruments also imply an economic 
transfer, generally top‐down. However, establishing such cooperative relationships is 
usually a win‐win strategy for local governments because it gives them the 
opportunity to act and make decisions, even if in most cases this capacity to act is not 
usually accompanied by a political transfer of competencies with regard to the policy 
being implemented. So, the system faces a kind of administrative decentralisation 
without political decentralisation: none of the instruments allows citizen participation 
in the election of representatives, who are neither responsible nor accountable. 
 
Data used in this article were gathered within the framework of a research project 
funded by Catalan institutions. Hence, the researchers had the opportunity to access a 
particularly wide range of original documents that proved especially useful for the 
objectives of this paper. Naturally, the model could also have been completed using 
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available public data, but in this case we opted for a more detailed analysis in order to 
check the validity of the model. A database for extracting information from the original 
documents for each cooperative linkage was designed. This database included 
information for every cooperative instrument in force in 2009 and covering the 
duration of the link, the formal regulations and process for creation of the entity, the 
existence of a new institutional body, the kind of responsibility (whether or not it was a 
local undertaking), the possibility of a veto option, earmarked funding and options for 
introducing local objectives. Once this information was obtained for every instrument, 
values for the two axes were assigned according to the process specified in the 
previous section. 
 
The aggregation of data could have a concrete sense, in that it can be seen as 
constituting strategic direction or leadership in the implementation of the 
intergovernmental relations. As Table 2 shows, researchers identified an impressive 
number of institutional links in 2009, even focusing only on instruments that treated all 
participating levels of government on equal legal terms. This will to cooperate was 
channelled by an agreement between governments to institutionalise the tie, and often 
included an economic transfer and a sort of deal related to the delivered service and 
the tenure of legal powers. Table 3 sets out the basic descriptive variables for each of 
the four indicators,  flexibility and rigidity, autonomy and dependence, before their 






The model has been built using data identified in an analysis of the situation in 
Catalonia. Table 4 shows the final values for both axes considered separately after 
normalisation of each indicator (0–1). According to the theory outlined above, the 
system should be placed in the area assigned to the bargaining option in our map 
(Figure 2). This position implies a medium to low degree of autonomy and a strong 
tendency towards flexibility. According to the model, local governments are supposed 
to bargain with central authorities in order to be able to develop their functions. In 
terms of the flexibility‐rigidity axis (FR), the model tends to be flexible. As for 
autonomy‐dependence (AD), the results are less clear, with the numerical designation 
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Contrasting these results with both the observed reality in 2009 and other approaches 
to the subject shows interesting aspects. Firstly, in relation to the flexibility feature, the 
result is consistent with the use (or even overuse) of agreements as a formal 
mechanism, since these instruments are the most flexible of all cooperative tools. The 
position on the autonomy variable is less clear, which the researchers consider to be 
consistent with the systemic reality at that time. Although local governments have a 
wide range of diverse activities and functions, the fact is that the intervention and 
relevance of the central authority is acknowledged in the literature (Martínez‐Alonso 
Camps and Ysa Figueras, 2003; Pano et al., 2009; Ysa Figueras, 2007). 
 
In conclusion, the main characteristics of the Catalan system of central‐local relations, 
having empirically ‘fuelled’ our theoretical model, are well reflected to coincide with 
the literature at that moment in time, and can be summarised as follows.  
- Flexibility in the use of formal mechanisms that allows an easy change 
in the patterns of the relationship.  
- Certain dependence on the centre, though not within the canons of a 
pattern of a strong centre, so the systemic leadership is still not clear. 
- A relationship based on a bargaining process between central and local 




In this paper, a model of cooperative relations within a concrete reality is constructed 
and tested. The model establishes two main vectors of analysis (autonomy and 
dependence, flexibility and rigidity) to analyse the impact of non‐conflicting, 
cooperative relationships in a whole system of local governments on their effective 
autonomy and capacity. These vectors are grounded in a policy instrument approach, 
multi‐level governance theories and intergovernmental relations key features. The 
analysis of autonomy is one of the traditional fields of study in local government, and 
including this element in the model was almost unavoidable. It is definitely one of the 
core characteristics for evaluating an institutional system. The second aspect, flexibility 
and rigidity, is more debateable, but Hooghe and Marks (2003) identified it as a 
relevant component of intergovernmental relations in a multi‐tiered system that is 
more closely associated with cooperation than conflict between governmental units. 
The current evolution of institutional settings implies the need for approaches that can 
incorporate changing conditions and a dynamic process. Working with the concepts of 
flexibility and rigidity implies including this feature in the map and making 
transformations visible.  
 
In this sense, the combined effect of both theoretical axes allows us to present our four‐
option theoretical model, describing four possible situations in which 
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intergovernmental relations can be placed depending on the characteristics of their 
cooperative relationships. Firstly, the ‘agreeing’ position implies great respect for local 
autonomy and a high level of flexibility in the use of cooperative instruments. 
Secondly, the ‘partner’ model implies the results of a strong and stable partnership. 
Thirdly, the ‘bargaining’ typology presumes a bargaining process between institutions 
negotiating from different positions. Finally, the ‘strong centre’ model represents the 
pure idea of centralised cooperative systems and implies clear leadership from the 
centre. Our approach to local autonomy is not strictly based on a policy‐making 
approach, since local autonomy is simultaneously a matter of efficacy in political terms 
(that is, policy‐making), and an effective capacity to self‐organise (this is, the ability to 
self‐determine the local organisation with few constraints). Our model permits us to 
trace both aspects when combining our theoretical axes.  
 
So, when stimulated numerically our findings are consistent with the theoretical 
model, since the picture emerging from it intertwines theory and observation at that 
moment of time well. Hence, this theoretical model allows the monitoring and 
evaluation of the key elements of effective intergovernmental relations, and their 
inclusion in the assessment of local autonomy. Ladner et al. (2016) also noted the need 
to incorporate evolution into the analysis; this is particularly relevant when referring to 
multi‐level and intergovernmental mechanisms that can vary over time and are 
designed to allow flexibility. In this respect, working with time series would make it 
possible to track the evolution of a system and would, in fact, be one of the effective 
added values of this model.  
 
With regard to the limitations of our model, as well as the absence of conflict, it 
captures the observable relations between tiers of government and is able to monitor 
them in a concrete space and time, but does not take into account the nature of the 
collaboration or the relative strength of local governments at any time. That is, at this 
stage of the research our model cannot control for whether the observed collaboration 
is due to pressure from tiers of government other than local or regional ones, European 
Union policies or the actual political autonomy granted to local units. It could be 
argued that there is certain pressure from other tiers, besides local and regional ones, to 
cooperate, but ultimately this is unlikely to challenge our theoretical and empirical 
assumptions. Moreover, more refined analyses can be carried out in subsequent studies 
taking into account the political power of each municipality, since this can affect the 
way they choose (or are able) to collaborate. 
 
In any case, in the current big and open data era this kind of process will become easier 
and more affordable. In this context, local government studies benefit from particular 
features that improve the conduct of this kind of analysis: a large ‘N’ configuration (a 
large number of units to be included) and reasonable equivalence in concepts and 
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bodies that allows comparability. Therefore, more work should be aimed at building 
metric models so that institutional studies might profit from these new conditions. 
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1 Although there is associated literature on the problems posed by the measurement and aggregation of 
indicators (Nardo et al., 2005), particularly at the local level (da Cruz and Marques, 2013; da Cruz et. al., 
2016), we do not weight our measure since no substantiated theoretical expectations on which to base 
such a decision are available at this time.  
2 It could be argued that, given these conditions, it is difficult to expect the system to score low on the 
autonomy-dependence continuum when cooperative relations are considered. However, the model is 
designed to analyse the institutional setting developed by the free will of the parties and, consequently, 
juxtaposed to a specific territorial structure. That is why we have operationalised this concept from the 
four internal characteristics of the relationship, illustrating the maximum and minimum levels of material 
dependence in a relationship that has been formally established on an equal footing. 
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